Image: OPSAL members Ramón Balcázar M., Ingrid Garcés Millas and Rudecindo Espíndola, along with an environmental monitor for the Community of Toconao, during a visit to the Tara Salt Flat. OPSAL Archives

Despite the advance of lithium mining, the people of the Puna de Atacama continue to resist extractivism.

Authors: Javiera Ortiz, Ramón Balcázar M., Véronica Gostissa and Vivian Lagrava.
Edited by: Ramón Balcázar M. and Lynda Sullivan

Versión original en español aquí.

1. Lithium extractivism in the Puna de Atacama

During the last decade, Chile, Argentina and Bolivia were at the centre of the debate around decarbonization and the extraction of strategic minerals for the transition to carbon neutral energy. The promise of countries in the Global North to move from an economy based on oil extraction, towards the development of renewable energy sources and the expansion of electromobility as the main bastion, is driving a growing demand for minerals that have been designated as “key”: primarily copper, cobalt, coltan, graphite, nickel and lithium. 

Indeed, the implementation of such energy transition policies for industrial economies is based on a technological change which entails a process of devastation of indigenous and rural territories located in the Global South and on the peripheries of Europe. The ecologically unequal exchange of the green economy perpetuates a model of extractive primary development that, despite the strategies deployed by both businesses and governments, continues to be questioned and rejected by defenders and activists.

In this process of ecological transition, under the premise of “Climate Action”, and in the face of a post-pandemic economic reactivation scenario, these three countries have been more than spectators. Together with transnational corporations and industries – and their respective state departments – the governments of Chile, Argentina and Bolivia have facilitated the installation and development of the lithium extractive industry by various means.

These strategies are implemented in conjunction with a new form of social engineering with advertising programs which present lithium mining as sustainable, through interventions in the territory and through the use of “responsible mining” standards promoted by the mining sector itself. The greenwashing of lithium at the local, national and international levels hides the real and specific consequences of expanding the industry within the territories. 

Lithium extraction not only risks the ecological balance associated with the high consumption of fresh water and brine by mining in extremely arid territories, but has also dried up rivers, modified the local economies of the territories that inhabit the areas around the salt flats, increased socio-environmental conflict and further strained relations with the respective states and governments of these three countries. This results in consequences to the ways of life of these ancestral territories, whose cultures have evolved over millennia. 

But in addition to the minerals contained in its rocks and salt flats, the Puna Atacameña is a region with many native peoples and ways of life that are culturally, socially and economically connected in ways that transcend borders. It is in this context that the defence of mining expansion around the Salar de Atacama (Atacama Salt Flat) in Chile; the Los Patos River in Catamarca and the Salinas Grandes and Guayatayoc Lagoon basin in Argentina; and the salt flats and lagoons of Nor Lípez and Sud Lípez located within the Lípez Nation in Bolivia are examples of how different peoples and communities come together to say, “Water is worth more than lithium!”

2. Chile and the Atacama Salt Flat: social engineering and the “National Lithium Strategy” 

The impacts of mining extractivism on the Andean salt flats and wetlands of the Puna de Atacama are not new in Chile: with the extractivist cycle of saltpetre, the Atacama Desert underwent profound social, political, cultural and ecological transformations as a result of the saltpetre boom. This natural fertilizer was used in the Green Revolution for the intensive production of food and fodder, as well as for explosives and chemical products, which were exported in large quantities to Europe, mainly to the United Kingdom, Germany, and France; as well as to the United States, the Soviet Union and Asian countries. 

The income from saltpetre exports provided between 50% and 60% of the income of the national coffers for decades, resulting in the increased reliance that characterizes the economies of the region to the present day. At the end of the twentieth century, the world production of sodium nitrate was around 520,000 tons per year, of which 450,000 tons (86%) were produced in Chile. 

The industrialization of the desert in the regions of the Norte Grande was accompanied by significant migration to an area that had been sparsely populated until then. The desert saw the rapid arrival of European investors and workers from Peru, Bolivia and other regions of Chile. Tensions over the control of this mineral and the intervention of the British led to the so-called War of the Pacific (1879-1883), which resulted in the annexation of the territory to Chile, including the Atacama Salt Flat. The rise and fall of the saltpetre industry in Chile exemplifies how neocolonial and extractivist greed bring regional conflicts, leaving behind the impacts of human, social and environmental sacrifice. 

As a result of the technological changes marked by the electrification of the world economy, metals such as copper became indispensable, and Chile quickly positioned itself as the world’s largest exporter of this mineral. In 1915, the Chuquicamata exploitation project began. A business that was nationalised by Salvador Allende, Chuquicamata used to be the largest open-pit copper mine in the world. This mine is currently part of the Minera Escondida megaproject, controlled mostly by Australian and British businesses through BHP and Rio Tinto. Rio Tinto is currently entering the lithium market in Chile and Argentina. 

Just as it was with saltpetre and copper mining, the Atacama Salt Flat is now being exploited for lithium extraction. Although the first cases of lithium extraction date back to the 1960s and 1970s with inspections by the U.S. company Anaconda Copper Mining, the violent entry of neoliberalism carried out during the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet laid the foundations for what lithium mining is today. Along with the illegitimate privatization in favour of Julio Ponce, the dictator’s former son-in-law, a series of reforms were imposed in the 1980s that fostered the expansion of mega-mining and the privatization of water, allowing the rise of the Sociedad Química y Minera Soquimich (now SQM), the main lithium company in Chile. This situation would be reinforced with the election of democratic governments, which granted contracts to private companies such as SQM (a private Chilean company) and Albemarle (a United States corporation) for extraction quotas up to 2030 and 2043, respectively. 

Conflict and new paradigms in community relations 

In the 2000s, lithium companies faced a new scenario determined largely by two factors: the increase in demand for strategic minerals, and the presence of communities that react to mining activities and to the impact they have on their territories. According to the OECD report (2016), Chile lacks an effective mechanism to manage the special rights of indigenous peoples, which exacerbates socio-environmental tensions related to land acquisition, access to water, and the presence of mining and industrial facilities in local communities. Access to environmental information has improved thanks to the consolidation of the National Environmental Information System (SINIA), although many environmental indicators and data, especially those related to water, waste, biodiversity and air quality, remain inaccessible or incomplete. 

In order to avoid the social conflict that could have been triggered by the expansion of its operations in the Atacama Salt Flat, Albemarle signed an unprecedented cooperation agreement in 2016 with 18 Atacameño communities who were members of the Consejo de Pueblos Atacameños (Atacama Peoples’ Council Association). Among other things, this agreement provided for 3.5% of the company’s sales to be set aside and for communities to participate in environmental monitoring, conditional on obtaining the Environmental Qualification Resolution (RCA) needed for the expansion. In this way, a new benchmark in community relations has been created in Chile that will impact SQM’s extensive processes in 2018 and 2024, as well as the awarding of Special Lithium Operation Contracts (CEOL) in new salt flats such as Maricunga, Ollagüe, Ascotán and Laguna Verde. Indeed, within the framework of the implementation of the National Lithium Strategy, interested companies have supported agreements that, according to complaints from the affected communities themselves, prevent truly open consultations and give companies the advantage in administrative processes and in consultations carried out by the Ministry of Mining. 

While much has been said about benefit-sharing agreements and their positive and negative implications for the communities that are part of them, what worries us is that the expansion processes of both Albemarle and SQM were not subjected in advance to free and informed consultation in accordance with ILO Convention 169, and that they were authorised without sufficient knowledge about the potential impacts, that is, without compliance with the precautionary principle. In addition, the expansion of operations was justified in a corporate narrative based on the idea that brine extraction has no effects on the hydrology and biodiversity of the Salt Flat. As expected, the criticisms and concerns of communities and environmentalists were confirmed. In 2025, the Albemarle company itself acknowledged the decline of aquifers in the midst of a criminal investigation.

Poor participation in the National Lithium Strategy 

The National Lithium Strategy was developed without the participation of civil society, academia, territorial organizations and, above all, the peoples and communities neighbouring the salt flats, who were the first to be affected by mining operations in the country’s salt flats in the context of profound vulnerability to climate change. We have also seen that this exclusion contrasts with the more than 100 lobby meetings that the Government had with representatives of companies interested in expanding the electromobility market and lithium mining, and whose ideas can therefore be reflected in the proposal presented to the country. This logic of participation, where peoples and civil society organizations find themselves in unequal conditions with respect to corporate lobbying, was repeated during the implementation of the Strategy. There were delayed participation processes and non-binding indigenous consultations that ignored the Right to Say No to lithium mining and were largely oriented to the delivery of benefits from a mining process that, in the opinion of indigenous defenders, seems “inevitable”. 

Reactions from the Global North to the problem of the unsustainability of lithium 

European regulations on due diligence and value chains, as well as the Critical Raw Materials Act, recognize the importance of incorporating more consultation with the indigenous communities that inhabit these territories; however, it is not within their power to make this mandatory for companies operating in Chile. In countries such as Germany, car manufacturers have joined the ranks of the many companies adhering to international standards and private certification, showing the relevance of the Initiative for the Assurance of Responsible Mining (IRMA). Companies such as SQM and Albemarle seek to present this adhesion as proof of good socio-environmental behaviour, despite the fact that there has been no consultation regarding their extensive activities and that both companies have been involved in litigation and lawsuits by both indigenous communities and the State of Chile for violation of the right to consultation and for environmental damage in the Atacama Salt Flat.

New mining threats to the Andean salt flats

An example of the conflicts relating to new mining activities in the salt flats of Chile has been the resistance shown by the Lickanantay community of Toconao in defence of the Tara Salt Flat. It was proposed to install eight drilling platforms near the Tara Salt Flat, which is located about 150 km east of the town and is also protected by the Ramsar Convention. This proposal generated widespread opposition due to its possible impact on water, biodiversity and ancestral cultural practices such as llama grazing. For Rudecindo Espíndola, who belongs to the Toconao community and is a member of OPSAL (the Plurinational Observatory of Andean Salt Flats), “The rejection of the exploration of the Aida project in the Tata Poquis (sacred mountain) represents justice for the Lickanantay people of Toconao and our ancestors. As the children of this land, we will defend and protect our territories and our waters against the capitalist and extractivist invader.” 

The Toconao community and the Lickanantay people organised protest activities and presented comments to the Environmental Impact Assessment Service (SEIA) of Antofagasta, together with the technical team of the Andean Wetlands Alliance, a network formed in Chile by the Tantí Foundation, the NGO Environmental defence and the NGO FIMA. In a historic decision, and as a result of these actions, the environmental authority decided to reject the project, showing that with organization and cooperation, it is possible to defend human lives (and the lives of other beings) in Chile’s salt flats. 

Image: The Toconao community protests in front of the SEIA in Antofagasta. OPSAL Archive.

3. The defence of the Los Patos River in Catamarca, Argentina

The Los Patos River, in the Salar del Hombre Muerto (Hombre Muerto Salt Flat, Antofagasta de la Sierra, Catamarca, Argentina) is in danger of drying up due to the lithium mining activities there. The valley of the Trapiche River, located in the same Salar del Hombre Muerto area, in Argentina, is practically dry due to the lithium extraction that the mining company Livent (now Rio Tinto) has been carrying out for more than 30 years. But drying up a river has not been a reason for mining companies to stop extraction. Quite the opposite: the company with its “Fénix” project is tripling the volume, while they intend to install another ten projects in the salt flat, with the endorsement of the Government of Catamarca.

This is what Verónica Gostissa, a member of Pucara (Pueblos Catamarqueños en Resistencia y Autodeterminación), and co-coordinator of OPSAL in Argentina, was able to verify after the multiple meetings and activities with communities in Antofagasta de la Sierra. 

“The indigenous communities of the area are protecting the water and the territory from the advance of extractivism. One of the consequences of lithium mining is the drying up of the floodplain, the rivers and the entire salt flat. Because this water source has been exhausted and more than ten projects are being put in place, they now want to draw water from the Los Patos River, which is the largest river in the entire salt flat. All of this, without any kind of comprehensive evaluation in order to understand the potential damage of all the ten projects operating at the same time,” explains the lawyer.

Effects on communities, danger to their animals and changes to the local economy are some of the impacts that the inhabitants of Antofagasta de la Sierra have been experiencing in the territories since 1997, due to the activities of lithium mining companies. This is because the drying up of rivers due to mining operations makes it impossible for communities to continue with their economic activities, which are mainly the livestock industry, agriculture and tourism. For Elizabeth Mamani, a member of the Atacameño Community of the Salar del Hombre Muerto Altiplano and a member of OPSAL, lithium extraction in the salt flat means destruction. “There is an environmental disaster that the State does not recognize, encouraging foreign companies to come and extract lithium in exchange for a few jobs, with minimal progress for the communities but significant impact. The town where I live in Antofagasta de la Sierra went from being a very quiet town to one with a lot of activity,” she explains.

Image: The Dry Floodplain of the Trapiche River. Photograph by Verónica Gostissa

Argentina is currently positioned as the fourth country in the world with the highest lithium carbonate extraction: in 2023, it produced 51,101 tons of the so-called “white gold”, with a growth of 45.67% in its lithium production during that year, as reported by the Ministry of Economy. “They talk to us about ‘green or clean’ mining, but at the sacrifice of what? Of many communities, at the expense of the healthy environment we had, in exchange for sacrificed areas, disappeared villages and sick people who end up dying poor,” adds Elizabeth.

Despite the ruling of the Court of Justice of Catamarca that ordered a comprehensive and cumulative study of the impact of lithium mining on the salt flat, ecosystems continue to be endangered by the projects still in force that exploit these territories, disregarding the historical claims of the communities. From such communities, we already know what happens when the greed of multinationals has no limits: dry rivers, destroyed ecosystems and abandoned communities. 

Protests in defence of the Salinas Grandes basin and Guayatayoc Lagoon in Argentina 

In 2010, at the same time as the mining activities at the Olaroz-Cauchari salt flats, which became the Sales de Jujuy facility, were underway, exploration began in Salinas Grandes. The 33 indigenous communities, with their tradition of economic and social collaboration, initiated actions that reached the Supreme Court of Justice. Although their actions failed, the mining projects ceased.

Since then, various lithium mining companies, with the unconditional support of the Jujuy state, have continued to encounter opposition from the communities, with protests and roadblocks being put in place in 2019. To legitimize the handing over of indigenous territories to lithium and heavy metal mining companies, the provincial government of Jujuy modified the Provincial Constitution in 2023. This led to urban mobilizations and repression, as well as a roadblock in Purmamarca which saw savage repression in which many people were injured and detained, but it was sustained for a while thanks to the leadership of indigenous peoples and social support from the environmental assembly of Jujuy, Juntos Podemos en un Ambiente Sano (Together We Can a Healthy Environment) and other actors.

In 2024, the national government approved the RIGI (Large Investment Incentive Regime), a regime of facilities for investments of more than $200,000,000 USD that also benefit mining companies, such as the multinational company Rio Tinto in a lithium mine in Salta.

Repressive regulations were also adopted, both at the provincial and national levels, with the purpose of leaving them defencelessness against the intrusion of security forces in indigenous territory, and even violating freedom of expression. However, peaceful resistance was expressed in assemblies, marches of hundreds of kilometers and local political participation, such as the recent election of Erika Cañari as Moreno’s Spokesperson.

Image: Indigenous communities of Jujuy protesting in the province’s capital. OPSAL Archive.

4. Bolivia: Failure to comply with the constitutional protection of the rights of Mother Earth and the human rights of indigenous communities of the Lipez Nation

In Bolivia, the multinationals came into the country, as in Chile and Argentina, by means of international economic diplomacy and government impetus, despite the existence of a much more protectionist regulatory framework for the rights of indigenous peoples, Mother Earth and Water.

Although the rights of indigenous peoples are recognised and the protection of Mother Earth has been constitutionalised, the ecosystems where native peoples live bear the brunt of the effects of the socio-environmental impacts of mining extractivism. A cruel irony in a country with a majority indigenous population. This incongruity exists because the State has prioritised the exploitation of natural resources, including metallic and non-metallic minerals, such as gold, copper and lithium. 

Lithium exploitation areas

Bolivia’s Ministries of Mining and Hydrocarbons promote mining on behalf of the State, which implies the protection of foreign direct investment (FDI), so that it is superimposed on that entire legal framework. In fact, it does not cover the regulation and monitoring of large and small mining activities (mining cooperatives and multinationals). There are mining megaprojects that exploit mineral complexes, silver, gold and recently those for the exploitation of lithium. 

Indeed, within the framework of the 2014 National Lithium Strategy, all of the Salt Flats and Salt Lagoons of the Country were declared Fiscal Reserve areas. Lithium exploitation is planned in three territories covering two departments. Two large areas are earmarked in the department of Potosí: 1) in the southern sector of the Uyuni Salt Flat (Lliphi) and 2) within the Lopez [sic] Ramsar Site, which comprises the Chiguana, Pastos Grandes and Empexa Salt Flats and includes 14 lagoons: Pasto Grande, Hedionda Sur, Hedionda Norte, Kollpa Laguna, Laguna Verde, Luriqui Mayu, Coranto, Cañapa, Laguna Colorada, Laguna Blanca or Polques, Mamakhumu, etc. Also in the Department of Oruro in the Sabaya Lagoon and Coipasa Salt Flat.

Subjugation of indigenous territories

The ayllus of Sud Lípez are 26 communities located on the Bolivia-Chile and Bolivia-Argentina borders. Two of the communities (Quetena Grande and Quetena Chico) have similar cultural features to the Lickanantay indigenous people of Chile, such as the Kunza language and some practices and customs. In this and other communities, ethnic identity has been rooted since before Colonisation, as in the case of the Llipi Nation (The Great Land of the Lipez). The peoples of the Lípez Nation warn that the Government intends to sanction unjustifiable exploitation of lithium, and that contracts with the Chinese consortium CBC and the Uranium One Company (Rosatom) will cause the disappearance of aquifers in high-risk areas.

The incursion of these companies does not respect the people’s self-determination, original self-governance systems, rules and procedures or cultures. In 2023, the Council of the Original Government of the Lípez Nation made a statement to the Community of Rio Seco renouncing the position of the presidents of YLB. Additionally, in two communities in other cabildos, Villa Mar and six other communities, there were demonstrations against the exploitation at the Lípez Ramsar site. The president was notified by letter and a response was never received. 

Bolivian non-governmental organizations, such as Empodérate, promote access to information and participate in indigenous councils at the request of the communities, explaining the scope of legal protections for both human rights and wetlands. In that regard, given that political leaders include the demands for environmental justice in their speeches, which both communities and NGOs have sustained, this was publicly denounced. In addition, a statement has been issued denouncing the fact that companies and the Government intend to exploit lithium in territories that are at risk, areas considered to be protected due to the biodiversity that these ecosystems host. The life systems of the surrounding indigenous communities are at risk, since they have not considered that, due to the high water demand from lithium mining, all sources of fresh water are exposed, all of these sources being interconnected. Neither is it an area in which the communities live mainly from tourism, livestock and agriculture. 

Image: map showing in yellow the “areas reserved for the State” that overlap the territories titled as Indigenous Native Peasant Territories (TIOC) and that encompass the freshwater wetlands, inside and outside the Lípez Ramsar Site.

Image: The photo shows the Pastos Grandes Ecosystem, the Salt Flat, the wetlands and the lagoon. The perimeter that overlaps its water sources is shown in red: YLB is conducting exploration and URANIUM ONE has already set up its installation.

Uyuni Salt Flat: mining threatens natural heritage and tourism

The majestic Uyuni Salt Flat has a tourist area (Colchani, Incahuasi and other surrounding sectors) that is popular all year round; in fact, it is one of the best-known tourist destinations in the world. Despite this, its exploitation has been determined, without considering that it is “a single ecosystem” that can be negatively impacted; this is because, to date, no hydrogeological studies have been carried out to understand the groundwater system and whether lithium extraction is possible. This should be a priority, especially when we see the level of degradation of the Atacama Salt Flat following decades of exploitation and several projects in the same territory.

The map below shows the territory where mining exploitation is concentrated. Great Thunupa Salt Flat, better known as Salta de Uyuni, where there are 17 communities that depend on the Rio Grande and that are affected by the digging of wells for lithium extraction. In contrast, YLB states that only five would be within the area of Influence of the lithium projects. (In 2021, Empoderate and CEDIB [Bolivia Documentation and Information Centre) carried out an investigation that determined that the area was larger, that there was apparently lead contamination due to pipes in poor condition from drinking water projects and that the ecosystem’s imbalance was already apparent). 

The Uyuni Salt Flat is part of the territory of the Llica and Tahua markas as well as the Colcha ayllu (a marka, like an ayllu, is a traditional group of several communities); the three indigenous peoples amount to more than 50 communities, of which about 20 are within the area of influence of the lithium project. This is immense. The lithium projects were located in the South Sector of the Uyuni Salt Flat (called Liphi after Cerro Liphi), with two additional features: the perimeter is fenced, and the army had been guarding it for years when the community of Rio Grande mobilised (2015).

The movement of civil society against lithium contracts, but also against politicians

In March 2025, the communities declared a state of emergency, in response to the intention to approve the bill that seeks to favour the service contract for the production of lithium carbonate in the Uyuni Salt Flat between Bolivian Lithium Deposit (YLB) and the Hong Kong company CBC, and demanding the cancellation of the agreement with Uranium One Group (Russia) and CBC (China) for the installation of three industrial plants for the production of battery-grade lithium carbonate. In addition, in May of this year, the Central Única Provincial de Comunidades Originarias de Nor Lípez (Sole Provincial Centre of the Nor Lípez Native Community Lands) mobilised, seeking unsuccessfully to suspend lithium contracts.

Because the risks of exploitation are high in such fragile ecosystems, in March 2025, the Empower Human Rights Collective, the Potosí Environmental Protection Network, and about 74 environmental groups and defenders issued a statement, demanding that the precautionary principle be applied so that it is not exploited within the Lípez Ramsar site. Alerting the population that, in applying pro natura principles, hydrogeological studies should be carried out and the protection of the communities’ ways of life should be given priority. The general public questioned the signing of contracts with multinational companies for lithium extraction. 

The Plurinational Legislative Assembly has the duty to approve or reject contracts of national interest and to oversee the administration of natural resources for the benefit of the people. Likewise, the Bolivian constitution establishes that the conservation of fossil waters, wetlands, and groundwater is the duty of the State and of society as a whole, including legislators. 

Effects on ways of life

The wetlands, lagoons and salt flats are part of the ethnic identity of the communities, as are the ecosystems inhabited by the members of Mallku Villa Mar, which is made up of 170 families. The communities live essentially from tourism. Thousands of tourists visit these territories for their beauty and the biodiversity that include the Vinto Lagoon, Yapi Lagoon, the Black Lagoon with its wetland of almost 11 hectares, the Catal Lagoon, the Capina Lagoon, the Pastos Grandes Lagoon and Salt Flat, the wetlands that surround this lagoon, the Kara and Kachi Lagoons and the Ramaditas Lagoon. Each of these spaces is inhabited by species that the community cares for, particularly wallatas, wild ducks, trout and white flamingos that we know are in danger of extinction. This biodiversity is part of four tourist routes that Chile has designated as the Lagunas de Colores (Coloured Lagoons).

Images: Laguna Verde (Sud Lípez) and Laguna de Pasto Grande (Nor Lípez), both surrounded by Bofedales de Aguadulce. In the background are some birds (flamingos and ducks), which are part of the existing biodiversity that depends on these ecosystems. Archives of the Empodérate Collective. 

The communities also have cave paintings, chullpas and underground caves where stalactites can be seen, and there are two stone cities. There are abundant rock formations with whimsical shapes, such as boats, animals, the World Cup and others. This sector is called the Valley of the Rocks and Rome. They are basically rock formations made by volcanoes, and they are exploited more by Chilean agencies than Bolivian ones. The only park exploited, albeit in the territory of another municipality (Quetena), is the so-called Eduardo Avaroa Park, which has 1,000 visitors per week. 

Similarly, some of the Nor Lípez communities such as Mallku Villa Mar have equipped their houses to be used as hotels for community tourism, but the expansion of lithium mining companies threatens not only their ecosystems, but also their livelihood and the availability of water. These activities are complementary to the raising of camelid livestock and depend on the wetlands that are exposed to the imminent exploitation of lithium. “Before awarding contracts, the technical feasibility of the installation of mining companies must be analysed, with consideration towards the needs of the communities that inhabit those territories. The most worrying thing about this is that when water is extracted from the salt flats, they dry up, and what people do not want to understand is that the salt flats are interconnected, putting entire basins at risk,” explains Vivian Lagrava, co-coordinator of OPSAL in Bolivia and director of the Human Rights Collective Empodérate, who ends by saying that lithium mining today is essentially water mining.

5. Concluding Remarks

Lithium mining projects in Chile began during the dictatorship. Decades later, in the context of the so-called energy transition, they have expanded thanks to the support of the Chilean government and to social engineering for social validation on a local and international scale. The expansion of SQM and Albemarle is proof of this. Through a National Lithium Strategy, it is proposed that lithium mining is to expand in the Atacama Salt Flat and in new salt flats such as Maricunga, Coipasa, Ascotán, Ollagüe and Laguna Verde, among others. This process has not respected the self-determination of peoples and rather seeks to reproduce a highly institutionalised extractivist political, social and cultural model.

Thanks to a similar logic, Argentina’s government has also allowed the expansion of mining projects in Salar del Hombre Muerto, with direct consequences for ecosystems, drying up rivers and forcing mobilizations of farmers and community members. This situation was exacerbated by the appointment of Javier Milei to the presidency of the country and his implementation of the RIGI, a public policy through which investment is promoted while social protest is criminalised.

Meanwhile, in Bolivia, despite having a different constitutional model that recognizes the autonomy and self-determination of the peoples and nations that compose it, such as the Lípez Nation, private mining projects are advancing in alliance with the State. In this country, lithium extraction has not yet reached an industrial scale, causing tensions between different social sectors. The challenge for environmental organizations and communities is accessing information on the potential impacts to indigenous territories and ecosystems. 

Although the three countries have political differences when it comes to the institutional approach to lithium extraction, whether through a national strategy as in Chile, the implementation of the RIGI in Argentina, or the promise to implement Direct Lithium Extraction technology as in Bolivia, the truth is that all three countries encourage the presence of foreign and multinational capital, regardless of which side of the alliance they wish to support.

Local communities, environmental organizations and scientists continue to denounce the impacts of lithium extraction projects and the contradictions of a political, economic and social system that continues to look upon nature as a commodity that is separate from the community. The advance of evaporitic lithium exploitation affects the availability of surface and freshwater aquifers in an arid environment, threatening ways of life and ecosystems such as Andean wetlands, natural climate regulators and biodiversity hotspots. 

It is contradictory that valuable territories and ecosystems are sacrificed to combat the climate crisis. Clearly, what we see is the proliferation of extractivism with profits for a few. Who really benefits from lithium mining? What transitions and adaptations are possible in a context of climate crisis and green extractivism? Certainly, we cannot answer these questions without the participation of the peoples and the protection of the ways of life that inhabit the Puna de Atacama.